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FEDERAL COURT REVIEW BY EXTRAORDINARY WRIT:
A CLOGGED SAFETY VALVE IN THE FINAL
JUDGMENT RULE
THE final judgment rule I denies litigants in federal court immediate review
of most interlocutory orders 2 by prohibiting appeal from a decision on a
"preliminary or subsidiary point" until after final judgment.3 Congress
enacted the rule to keep appellate courts' work load within manageable limits
and to prevent appeals designed to harass opponents during trial.4 Yet liti-
gants often desire immediate review of adverse interlocutory orders merely
to preclude added delay and expense at the trial stage.3 And in some instances,
immediate reversal may avert injury which postponed appeal could not repair.0
In others, the litigant who can obtain no review of a "preliminary" order is
left without appeal at any stage.7
1. The rule is embodied in several statutes. 23 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1952) ; 15 U.S.c.§ 29 (Supp. 1952) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. 1952). For a discussion of these statutes
and others governing appeal, see 6 Mloors, FEoMNL Pacrxca. f1 54.04-54.09 (2d ed. 1953)
(hereinafter cited as Moo E).
2. There are a few exceptions to the rule. Interlocutory appeal is granted extensively
in bankruptcy and admiralty proceedings, and in a limited number of civil actions. See
6 Mooan 1 54.04 nn.13-15. Federal Rule 54(b) permits appeal of an order "finally" dit-
posing of one claim in a multiple claims suit, even though the entire suit has not termin-
ated at the trial stage. See Note, 62 YALE L.T. 263 (1953). Judicial decision has authorized
immediate appeal from three types of rulings: collateral orders, immediately executable
decrees disposing of property, and "separate" orders in multiple-party suits. Courts
consider such orders final when made, and hence they are not strictly exceptions to the
final judgment rule. Id. at 26S n.36.
3. 1 BLACK, JUnGMENTS § 21 (1391).
Because no one has defined "final judgment" comprehensively, its meaning is a frequent
subject of litigation. Those who advocate modification of the rule cite this continuing
dispute as one of the rule's primary disadvantages. See 6 MoonE T 54.43; Crick, The F;:al
Judg;wnt as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE UJ. 539 (1932) ; Sunderland, The Problem of
Appellate Review, 5 TEx.s L. RFx. 126 (1927); Notes, Proposals for Intcrlocutory
Appeals, 58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1949); The Final Judgment Rule in the Fcdcral Courts,
47 Coi- L. RFEv 239 (1947).
4. See Notes, 53 YALE UJ. 1186 (1949); 47 COL L RE . 239 (1947).
5. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943); Hydraulic
Press Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 185 F.2d S00, S02-03 (8th Cir. 1950).
6. See notes 37-46 infra and accompanying text.
7- See notes 27-36 infra and accompanying text.
Hardship which the final judgment rule imposes upon some litigants has prompted
suggestions for modification of the rule. See authorities cited second paragraph, sutra
note 3.
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Despite the final judgment rule, both the Supreme Court and the federal
courts of appeals can reverse interlocutory orders without delay by issuing
to lower courts extraordinary writs of common law certiorari, 8 mandamus,
or prohibition.9 Although review by writ procedurally resembles statutory
appeal, 10 the writ seeker faces obstacles which do not confront the appellant.
First, he must attempt to meet unusually ill-defined standards. Federal courts
dispose of most writ applications summarily," and those opinions written supply
few guides for future petitioners.'2 Secondly, courts construe existing stand-
ards restrictively. 13 Federal appellate courts are empowered to grant writs
8. The common law writ of certiorari should not be confused with the statutory writ
of certiorari. The statutory writ is the principal device by which a petitioner normally
obtains review by the Supreme Court; the common law writ is issued by both the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals only in extraordinary cases. See ROBERTS & KIRKHAM,
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 309 (Wolfson & Kurland
eds. 1951).
9. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (Supp. 1952). Certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition were used at common law. See FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES 177, 218, 414 (1926).
The Supreme Court has expressed unwillingness to decide, by issuing writs, questions
not of public importance or "otherwise appropriate," unless the case would have come
directly to it in the normal course of appeal. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584-5
(1943) (quoting Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 248-9 (1932)).
Of the extraordinary remedies, only the writs of common law certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus which issue to lower courts will be discussed here, because they alone
are used interchangeably to complement the appellate process. Although these writs per-
formed different functions at common law, courts at present treat them alike and petition-
ers often apply for them in the alternative.
10. Litigants file petitions similar to briefs and may argue before appellate courts,
which have power to reverse erroneous orders made below. Of course, procedural
details vary in different courts. See, e.g., State of Tennessee v. Taylor, 169 F.2d 626, 628
(6th Cir. 1948). See RoBERTs & KIRKHAM, Op. cit. mtpra note 8, at 585; Darden, Mandamus,
24 Miss. L.J. 95, 96 (1952). Courts often afford relief-though technically withholding
the writ itself-by serving notice on the erring judge that unless he modifies his order
a writ will issue. E.g., United States v. Hall, 9th Cir., Aug. 4, 1953.
11. Examination of the Docket Book and files of the Second Circuit, for instance,
reveals that of the forty-seven writ petitions filed with that court between December 30,
1947 and December 30, 1952, thirty-two were denied without opinion. There were four
full opinons, five per curiam opinions, three opinions in parallel appeals; and three
petitions were withdrawn before action was taken upon them.
The large number of denials without opinion may result in a falsely encouraging im-
pression of a petitioner's chances for obtaining a writ. Counsel may overlook the numerous
summary denials and see only that writs issued in a relatively high percentage of the cases
in which opinions are reported. See compilation in 44 FED. DIG. 193-8 (Supp. 1953).
12. For example, it is a common practice for a court to assume, without deciding,
that it has power to issue a writ in a particular case and then base its decision on other
grounds. See, e.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 448 (1929) ; In re Greene, 160
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1947).
13. See, e.g., Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947) ; United States v. Byers,
144 F.2d 455, 456 (2d Cir. 1944).
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"in aid of their respective jurisdiction."1 4 Although controversy has persisted
over the meaning of that phrase, 15 it is currently interpreted as authorizing
courts to use writs for two purposes only: first, to police lower courts by
compelling them to act within their jurisdiction,' or second, to review cases
where there is no appeal 17 or where litigants relying on statutory appeal
would suffer more than the ordinary hardship of delay.' 8 And most judges
actually will issue a writ only when doing so serves both purposes at once. °
A jurisdictional error in a lower court's interlocutory order justifies issuing a
writ in its policing role.2 0 The lower court may err jurisdictionally at the outset
by refusing to hear a case within its jurisdiction 21 or by trying a case in
which it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter 2 or parties.3 And a court
which initially had jurisdiction over a case may exceed its authority by contra-
vening a rule or statute of procedure.2 4 Thus the statute which. permits venue
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. 1952).
15. See, e.g., the dispute between Judge Learned Hand and Judge Frank in 'Magnetic
Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950).
16. "The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common
law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise
of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty
to do so." Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). The cases contain
numerous variations on this theme.
17. See notes 27-36 infra and acompanying text.
18. See notes 37-53 infra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., United States Alkali Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 1%q,, 202-03
(1945) ; Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F2d 610, 615-16 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denicd,
344 U.S. 921 (1953). The Supreme Court has stated that common law writs may be
granted or withheld in the sound discretion of the courts, and that issuing a writ is not a
question of power, but one of appropriateness. E.x parle Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 534 (1943) ;
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25-6 (1943). See Wolfson, Ertraordinary
W~rits in the Supreme Court Since Ex Parle Peru, 51 CoL L RE,. 977 (1951). But
this has not made it easier to procure a writ. For example, in the Roche case the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's use of mandamus as inappropriate. And
courts of appeals have continued to question their power to issue writs. See, e.g.,
Clinton Foods v. United States, 188 F. 2d 2S9, 292 (4th Cir.), cert. denicd, 342 U.S.
825 (1951); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Interstate Equip. Corp., 176 F.2d 419, 420
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949). Wolfson, mipra at 992.
20. See note 16 supra. Some courts will issue a writ only if the jurisdictional error
is clear. See cases cited note 60 infra.
21. See, e.g., Exr parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942) (on writ petition, resident
enemy alien held not barred from courts by § 7 of the Trading with the Enemy Act);
United States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1944), ccrt. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945)
(mandamus to judge erroneously refusing to hear case on ground that attorney had no
authority to prosecute condemnation proceedings on behalf of the United States);
cf. Czuczka v. Rifldnd, 160 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. See, e.g., Petition of Therianos, 171 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1948); Ward Baking Co.
v. Holtzoff, 164 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1947).
23. Blaw-Knox Co. v. Lederle, 151 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1945). Cf. Hydraulic Press
Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 185 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1950).
24. Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), ccrt denicd, 344 U.S.
921 (1953) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d), new trial) ; United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F2d
1953]
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changes for convenience, limits accessible forums to those in which the plaintiff
could have brought his action originally. 25 Courts of appeals therefore will
use writs to void, as jurisdictional errors, transfers to districts where process
could not have reached the defendant.20
To invoke writs as instruments of review, litigants must show that ordinary
channels of appeal offer them no adequate remedy. Appeal may be non-
existent; lower court action may have obstructed it where it is available;
or, thirdly, where appeal is available and unobstructed, the lower court's order
may be abnormally detrimental to one party.
In a few instances, writs constitute the sole means of reviewing lower court
error. There is no appeal from a district judge's noncompliance with the
statute 27 ordering him to summon a three-judge court in a suit to enjoin state
officers from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute.28 Therefore the
Supreme Court considers the writ of mandamus proper to force district judges
to convene three-judge courts.29 The Court has utilized common law certiorari
to examine thwarted attempts to reach the courts of appeals.30 And there is no
other feasible way to review judicial disregard of the federal statute 81 waiving
prepayment of fees and costs for impecunious appellants.3 2 Mandamus has
issued to remand to state courts criminal prosecutions improperly removed to
federal court.33 States can neither appeal these removals when made nor
393, (3d Cir. 1951) (Admiralty Rule 432, reference to master); Stratton v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930) (three-judge court statute) ; Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight,
181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950) (venue statute).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. 1952).
26. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1950); cf. Clinton
Foods v. United States, 188 F.2d 289, 292-3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 825 (1951);
Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777, 780-1 (9th Cir. 1950).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. 1952).
28. Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1930).
29. Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 355 (1940). The fact that three-judge court
decisions are directly appealable to the Supreme Court, see Stratton v. St. Louis S.W.
Ry., supra note 28, is another reason why the Supreme Court will grant mandamus here.
But the Court has construed the statute restrictively. For example, although district
judges may not dismiss applications for three-judge courts on their merits, they may
for lack of federal jurisdiction. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). And see Moom,
COMMFNTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE, text accompanying 1 0.03(20) nn.19-28 (1949).
30. See, e.g., House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1944) (district judge refused to issue
certificate necessary to appeal from habeas corpus decision) ; fit re 620 Church St. Building
Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936) (Supreme Court affirming Seventh Circuit's refusal to allow
appeal from district court confirmation of reorganization plan); It re Chetwood, 165
U.S. 443 (1897) (petitioners erroneously enjoined by district court from prosecuting their
suit in state court or applying for writ of error) ; cases cited note 32 infra.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Supp. 1952).
32. Steffler v. United States, 319 U.S. 38 (1943); cf. Roberts v. United States
District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
33. Thus mandamus has issued to remand cases erroneously removed under the
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 74 (1946), allowing removal of state criminal prosecutions in
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obtain review after a defendant's verdict. 34 Hence the Court has reviewed
by writ to protect the sovereign interests of the states.3 But the explicit
prohibition against reviewing a federal court's order remanding a case to state
court will not be circumvented by writ.""
Where Congress has provided appellate review, courts may nevertheless
issue writs "in aid of the appellate jurisdiction which might otherwise be de-
feated by the unauthorized action of the court below."37 Appeal from final
judgment, although possible, is valueless to the litigant when lower court
errors threaten to snuff out the issues before appeal can be taken.33 A trial
judge may defeat appellate jurisdiction by mistakenly ordering proceedings
before him stayed pending a state court's determination of issues which are
not in fact of peculiar state concern. 39 The decision of the state court may
bind the federal court by collateral estoppel or-if the cause of action is
identical in both courts-by res judicata. 40 In addition, the lower court may
emasculate appeal by keeping the case at the trial stage indefinitely.41 A civil
litigant therefore can procure mandamus to force a district judge to make a
which state constitutions or laws deprive defendants of civil rights. See. e.g., Virginia
v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1905). The court
has similarly remanded cases removed under the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 76 (1946), allowing
removal of state criminal prosecutions of federal revenue officers for offences committed
while performing their duties. See, e.g., Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932);
Virginia v. Paul, 148 U.S. 107 (1893)
34. See Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9,30 (1916); cf. United States v. Sanges,
144 U.S. 310 (1892).
35. Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), supra note 34, at 29-30. But where state sovereignty
was not at stake, a federal court denied mandamus when issuance promised to override
the federal criminal appeals statute. United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 02 (2d Cir. 1948).
And another court withheld mandamus in a civil case concerning a state, but where the
state's prerogative to try in its own courts violations of its laws was not involved and
where appeal after final judgment was available. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v.
Welsh, 188 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1951).
36. In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451 (1890); Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311
U.S. 199 (1940).
37. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1916).
38. Ibid.
39. Originally district judges had no discretion to stay federal suits pending the out-
come of state court proceedings, and appellate courts granted writs to vacate all stay
orders. See, e.g., McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 2M2 (1910); Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. 'Morris, 132 Fed. 945, 947-8 (Sth Cir. 1904). At present, district judges
have some discretion to issue stay orders, particularly in cases where critical issues are
peculiarly of state concern. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949).
Predicting the success of writ applications is especially difficult here because appellate
judges disagree on the boundaries of district court discretion to order proceedings stayed.
See, e.g., Jewell v. Davies, 192 F2d 670 (6th Cir. 1951); Mottolese v. Kaufman, .spra;
In re President & Fellows of Harvard College, 149 F2d 69 (1st Cir. 1945).
40. See cases cited note 39 supra.
41. See, e.g., Steccone v. Morse-Starrett Products Co., 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951);
Schwab v. Coleman, 145 F2d 672 (4th Cir. 1944).
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
decision on the merits of his case,42 while a criminal defendant can obtain the
writ to enforce his right to speedy trial.43 Similarly, mandamus will issue to
compel lower courts to perform such ministerial acts as supplying papers neces-
sary to the commencement or maintenance of suit.44 After an appellant has
won on appeal, he may suffer on remand from the lower court's noncompliance
with instructions of the superior court. 4 5 Litigants in this predicament have
always obtained mandamus.
46
Appellate courts have considered appeal inadequate in a few situations where
it is available and lower courts have not impaired it. Writs have issued to
void orders which directly or indirectly deny a litigant his right to trial by
jury, largely because that right is so highly prized that reversal on appeal
would be inevitable. 47 Although courts hold that ordinary inconvenience and
expense incurred by a litigant while waiting for appeal will not justify issuing
a writ,48 they have used writs to save litigants extraordinary detriment, such
as that caused by transfers to other venues 49 or reference of issues to a master
42. E.g., Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942) ; Czuczka v. Rifkind, 160 F.2d 308
(2d Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1944); Schwab v. Coleman,
145 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1944).
43. Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925); cf. Fowler v. Hunter, 164
F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1947).
44. See, e.g., Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932) (district judge refused to
issue bench warrant on indictment fair on its face and brought by properly constituted
grand jury); Ex parte Abdu, 247 U.S. 27 (1918) (clerk of court of appeals declined
to file record without deposit to secure costs,) ; Semel v. United States, 158 F.2d 231, 232
(5th Cir. 1946) (application to require that district clerk transmit notice of appeal).
45. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 334 U.S. 258 (1948);
In re Chicago, R.I., & Pacific Ry., 162 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1947).
46. "[T]he courts have uniformly held that where a lower court has failed to comply
with the mandate of the reviewing court, compliance with the mandate may be compelled
by a writ of mandamus." In re Chicago, R.I., & Pacific Ry., supra note 45, at 258.
47. See, e.g., Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924) ; Bereslavsky v.
Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947).
48. See cases cited note 5 mepra.
49. Two statutes authorize defendants to contest venue in civil cases: 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (Supp. 1952) permits transfer "for the convenience of parties and witnesses;"
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (Supp. 1952) permits transfer or dismissal of cases brought "in the
wrong division or district."
Challenges of lower court venue rulings constitute the largest category of writ petitions.
Only a small number of these involve § 1406(a). E.g., C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v.
Barnes, 194 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Lahy, 193
F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiamn, 344 U.S. 861 (1952). Of the many petitioners
seeking reversal of § 1404(a) orders, few have succeeded. The Second Circuit has
granted relief when a district judge violated the statute by transferring a case to a venue
in which it could not have been brought originally. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181
F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950). Also see Clinton Foods v. United States, 188 F2d 289, 292 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 825 (1951); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777,
779-81 (9th Cir. 1950). The Fifth Circuit has employed a writ to prevent retransfer of
a case after two mistrials. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Davies, 185 F.2d 766 (5th Cir.
1950). And two courts have granted extraordinary relief when district judges have
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for trial.5° In such cases, issuing writs is further justified on the ground that
erroneous transfer or reference seldom constitutes reversible error on appeal,
even though it may jeopardize a litigant's chances of succeeding.61 Regardless
of the availability or efficacy of appeal, appellate courts have long used the
writ of prohibition to prevent lower courts from damaging United States inter-
national relations by ordering seizure of foreign ships libeled in American
ports. -2 On this ground, for example, the Supreme Court issued prohibition
to forbid a district court from exercising further jurisdiction over a Peruvian
vessel after the State Department had recognized the ship's immunity.rt
Judicial disagreement concerning the standards governing writ issuance
seems partially responsible for the currently large number of unsuccessful
petitions.54 Most judges will issue a writ only to review an order which
embodies a jurisdictional error and from wlich appeal is inadequate.0 But
in a few opinions, courts have completely ignored the adequacy of appeal.
More often they have issued writs on the sole ground that appeal was inade-
failed to pass on the issue of convenience because of erroneous constructions of the
statute. Wiren v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Paramount Pictures v. Rodney,
186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951). But no court has used e.',traordin-
ary writs to reverse a district judge's decision on the actual question of convenience, although
several judges have implied that they might do so if the decision were sufficiently off
base. See, e.g., Magnetic Engineering & Mffg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F2d s'tj, 870
(2d Cir. 1950) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 331-2 (2d Cir. 1950) ; General
Portland Cement Co. v. Perry, 204 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir., 1953) ; Nicol v. Koscinsi,
188 F.2d 537, 533 (6th Cir. 1951).
50. See, e.g., Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1926); Mc-
Cullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940) ; United States v. Kirkpatrick, 136 F24 393
(3d Cir. 1950) (reference to commissioner in admiralty) ; Webster Eisenlohr v. Kalodner,
145 F2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944) (mandamus granted to limit scope of master's investigation to
issues in the case).
51. "[lIt will be extremely difficult for the... [petitioner] to show that it lost the case
because of the handicap of transfer. As for the added cost of trying the case in the
new forum it is hard to see how in any event it could be recoverable from the defendant,
for the error would be that of the court." Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings
M.Nfg. Co., 178 F2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 19,10).
52. E.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 573 (1943) ; Ex parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1891)
(British vessel forcibly taken into Sitka, Alaska and libeled by a United States Revenue
vessel) ; United States v. Peters, 3 DalL. 120 (U.S. 1795) (.American citizen libelcd
French corvette in Pennsylvania District Court).
53. Ex parte Peru, supra note 52. But cf. Republic of China v. National City Bank
of New York, 194 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1952).
54. The Second Circuit has afforded relief to only one of the forty-seven petitioner.
who filed their petitions between December 30, 1947 and Decemter 30, 1952. Some of thos ,
denials were undoubtedly the result of frivolous applications. And some petitions which
appeared to satisfy doctrinal requirements failed on their merits. See, e.g., Gocdman v.
Clancy, 195 F2d 235 (2d Cir. 1952); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F2d 329 (2d Cir.
1950); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
55. See note 19 supra.
56. See, e.g., American Airlines v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Blaw-Knox
Co. v. Lederle, 151 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1945).
1953]
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quate, even though the lower court's error was not jurisdictional. 7 Universal
acceptance of revised standards would save courts and litigants much of the
time and money they now waste on ill-advised petitions.
Even if doctrine were settled, however, the highly conceptual nature of the
distinction between jurisdictional error and "mere" abuse of discretion would
still make it difficult to foretell which label a court would apply in a particular
case. Theoretically a court errs jurisdictionally by making an order of a kind
which it lacks power to issue;58 when it abuses its discretion, it has power to
make the kind of order it issues but acts unreasonably under the circumstances.
But the distinction may be practically impossible for petitioners to draw. Even
the courts have floundered in the quagmire they created."0 While jurisdiction-
al errors tend to be more clearcut, not all of them are obvious. Even to detect
a jurisdictional error, the reviewing court often must scrutinize the trial
record closely. 0
Apart from the uncertainty it injects, confining the writs' operation to
jurisdictional errors may unfairly deny review to some petitioners for whom
appeal would be ineffective; one type of error can be as detrimental as another.
It is a Second Circuit policy, for instance, to issue writs correcting interlocu-
tory orders which change venue only if the order embodies a jurisdictional
error. 61 Thus the court will not use writs to review a transfer to a jurisdic-
57. E.g., Wiren v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Paramount Pictures v.
Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951); United States v.
Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1950).
58. Even this court-made concept has been criticized as too broad. See 6 Moomu,
U 54.10[4] nn.23, 24.
59. One district judge, for instance, refused to change the venue of a case for the con-
venience of the parties, in the erroneous belief that he lacked power to make the transfer
requested. The Third Circuit issued mandamus. It could reasonably have classified the
error by any one of three methods. The court could have termed the error jurisdictional
on the ground that the district judge refused to determine issues of justice and convenience
as required by the statute. Secondly, the error could have been labeled jurisdictional be-
cause the lower court misjudged its power. In the third place, the abuse of discretion
label was applicable; even though the judge had discretion to deny the transfer, he
abused it by resting his denial on an erroneous construction of the statute. In fact, the
Third Circuit used all of the foregoing rationales, thereby leaving subsequent petitioners
guideless at a triple fork in the road. Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F2d 111, 116
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951). Fortunately, the Third Circuit later identified
the Rodney error as an abuse of discretion. Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Leahy,
193 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiom, 344 U.S. 861 (1952).
60. See, e.g., American Airlines v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1953); Petition
of Therianos, 171 F2d 886 (3d Cir. 1948).
61. Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 955 (1952);
Arrowhead Co. v. The Aimee Lykes, 193 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1951); Magnetic Engineering
& Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950). The Third Circuit, on the
other hand, has stated that whereas it might correct abuse of discretion in transfer orders,
it will not correct jurisdictional errors contained in them. See Gulf Research & Develop-




tionally correct district, even though the transfer is erroneous because the new
venue is inconvenient and subjects a litigant to exorbitant expenses which he
cannot recover on appeal.32  Such discrimination seems arbitrary, unless
efficient judicial administration demands it.
An obvious rationale for immediately reversing jurisdictional errors only
is that their impact on the court system seems particularly serious; where
courts exceed their jurisdiction they "endanger" the jurisdiction of appellate
courts and the whole judicial structure. Such a fear seems exaggerated. A
court similarly exceeds its authority whenever it abuses its discretion or re-
fuses to follow a rule of substantive law enunciated by a superior court. And
on a practical level, no error can greatly harm the judicial system so long as
an appellate court can police its subordinates by reversing them on appeal
after final judgment.6 3
Since jurisdictional errors appear to damage neither litigants nor the
judicial system more than other errors do, characterization of lower court
mistakes provides no sound standard by which to judge writ petitions.
Nevertheless any error is unduly injurious when appeal supplies no effective
redress. And appellate courts have power to issue writs where appeal is
non-existent or would be ineffectual.6 4 Furthermore, issuing writs in such
a situation does not violate the policy supporting the final judgment rule,63
because petitioners will succeed only by showing more than the ordinary
hardship of delayed appeal. Therefore the inadequacy of appeal seems the
only valid criterion by wlidch to decide that a writ should issue to correct
lower court error.66
62. See Anthony v. Kaufman; Arrowhead Co. v. The Aimee Lykes; 1Magnetic
Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., supra note 61.
63. If jurisdictional errors were so harmful, it seems unlikely that courts would delay
correcting them until after final judgment as they do where appeal is adequate or the
error unclear. See notes 19, 20 supra and accompanying text.
64. See text at notes 17, 18 supra.
65. See text at note 4 suipra.
66. Even when courts do not ground their decisions on classification of the lower
court error, factors other than adequacy of appeal unfortunately influence disposition
of writ petitions. For example, the Eighth Circuit recently refused issuance of mandamus
to vacate an order transferring a case from one district to another in the same circuit on
the ground that such a transfer "cannot in any way impair or defeat the jurisdiction of this
court." There the court ignored the fact that extraordinary hardship is present in every
transfer to an erroneous venue, whether or not the case leaves the circuit. Carr v. Donohoe,
201 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1953).
While the Eighth Circuit discriminates against cases transferred uithin its circuit,
the Second discriminates against cases transferred out of its circuit. Although the latter
Circuit will correct both jurisdictional error and abuse of discretion in orders dcnyfng
transfer, it will correct only jurisdictional error in orders directing transfer. See cases
cited note 62 supra. The hardship of having to maintain suit in an improper venue is
"extraordinary" in both instances. Yet they are treated differently on the ground that in the
case of transfer, the court of appeals which gains jurisdiction over the action should decide
the propriety of venue. As Judge Frank points out in his dissent, "such a procedure
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What constitutes ineffectiveness of appeal should be defined clearly enough
to afford predictability and carefully enough to preserve the final judgment
rule. Such a definition obviously would include cases in which appeal is non-
existent or obstructed. Where appeal is available and unobstructed, courts
may stretch the concept of extraordinary hardship.67 For example, they now
employ writs to furnish jury trial immediately, even though inaction until
final judgment would produce only the normal inconvenience of delayed ap-
peal. 68 But most doctrines need a safety valve to accommodate unanticipated
or especially deserving claims. Stifling such clearly confined aberrations would
accomplish little.69 On the other hand, if widespread interlocutory appeal is
desired, the final judgment rule-not the scope of the writs-should change.
Barring that, the foregoing resolution of the conflicting demands for im-
mediate review and postponed appeal appears to draw a boundary, clearer
and more just, around the writs' domain.
involves, necessarily, considerable expense for the [petitioner]. . . .He must now reprint,
at least in part, the transcript and his brief, and must also pay his lawyer the expense
of a trip to Chicago and (presumably) another fee for the oral argument in the Seventh
Circuit." Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 870-1 (2d
Cir. 1950).
Without even mentioning extraordinary hardship in its opinion, the Third Circuit
recently denied a petition challenging lower court jurisdiction over the case. Its rationale
was that the alleged jurisdictional error was not clear, and that the district judge
considered the matter in dispute carefully. American Airlines v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230
(3d Cir. 1953).
67. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 203-04 (1945)
(ordinary hardship to litigant, plus "frustration of Congressional policy," justifies writ) ;
cf. Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
921 (1953) (writ granted over convincing dissent finding no extraordinary hardship).
68. Thus, in a typical jury trial case, the Third Circuit said:
"Appeal, after an abortive trial to the court, would be clearly an inadequate remedy."
Canister Co. v. Leahy, 191 F.2d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 1951).
Whereas, in a case not involving jury trial, the same court said:
"The mere fact that the petitioner will be put to the inconvenience of what may
prove to be a wholly abortive trial is an argument which might be addressed to
Congress in support of legislation authorizing interlocutory appeals, but does not
constitute grounds for invoking mandamus power."
Gulf Research & Development Co. v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd per
curiam, 344 U.S. 861 (1952).
69. Use of writs to ensure jury trial is a well established practice. See E. parte
Simons, 247 U.S. 231 (1917) ; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920) ; EX parle Skinner
& Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924); Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947) ; Goldblatt v. Inch, 203 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1953); Petsel v.
Riley, 192 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1951); Canister Co. v. Leahy, 191 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1951);
In re Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 188 F2d 833 (5th Cir. 1951).
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